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Strategic Patience and the Division of Czechoslovakia 
Czechoslovakia’s peaceful division, at the end of 1992, into independent Czech and Slovak republics is 
often held up as an example of successful conflict resolution to be emulated by other aspiring states.  
Contrasted, at the time, with the violent breakup of Yugoslavia and disorderly collapse of the USSR, the 
Czechoslovak case continues to be invoked today in debates such as those surrounding the 2014 
referendum on Scottish independence. 
No two cases can ever be exactly alike.  East-Central Europe is not the South Caucasus; and the 
international situation today is very different from that which prevailed in 1992.  All the same, the break-
up of the Czechoslovak state is worth examining since it was legal, peaceful and has proved to be durable; 
and also because the pre-1989 Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which had been federated since 1969, 
shared some strong family resemblances, both structural and ideological, with both the former Yugoslavia 
and the former Soviet Union.1 
 This paper seeks first to dispel a few common misconceptions about Czechoslovakia’s ‘Velvet 
Divorce’ of 1 January 1993.  Next, it points to some distinctive features of the break-up of the 
Czechoslovak state into separate Czech and Slovak states.  Finally, it considers what lessons might be 
taken from the Czechoslovak case of relevance to the aims of promoting peace and regional stability in the 
South Caucasus (and, indeed, Ukraine). 
* 
Czechoslovakia’s peaceful division into separate states on 1 January 1993 is often stated or implied – not 
least in official Czech and Slovak sources – to have been due to the ‘political maturity’ or innately 
                                                 
1 For the structure of the federated Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as it existed between 1969 and 1990, see laws 
66-85, Ústavní zákon o československé federaci‚ Sbírka zákonů Československé socialistické republiky, vol. 143 
(Prague, 1968) and also Law 143, ‘Ústavní zákon ze dne 27. října 1968 o československé federaci’ (known in Slovak 
as ‘Ústavný zákon o česko-slovenskej federácii’), Sbírka zákonů Československé republiky 1968, 41 (4 November 
1968), pp. 381-403. 
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‘democratic character’ of the two nationalities (peoples or ethno-linguistic groups) involved: the Czechs 
and the Slovaks.  This line of argument draws on a long Czech tradition of presenting the Czech-speaking 
population of the Bohemian Crown Lands (Bohemia, Moravia and formerly Austrian Silesia) as more 
‘progressive’ and ‘democratic’ than rival nationalities within the Habsburg Empire, especially the 
allegedly ‘aggressive’ and ‘imperialist’ German and Hungarian speakers.  It also draws on older self-
perceptions of the Slavs as ‘dove-like’ and peace-loving, again in contrast with local non-Slav 
populations, who are presented as militaristic or aggressive. 
The message that the Czech people or ‘nation’, and by extension the interwar Czechoslovak state, 
was innately democratic, progressive and peace-loving has nineteenth-century roots but was promoted 
with particular vigour during the First World War as a means to clearly distinguish Czech (and, later, also 
Slovak) speakers within the Austro-Hungarian Empire from German and Hungarian speakers; and to 
convince the Allied Powers to support fledgling Slovak and Czech independence movements as part of 
their strategy to defeat the Central Powers. 
While it is perfectly true that Czechs and Slovaks resolved their differences without violence or 
disorder in 1993, this tells us more about specifically Czech-Slovak relations at a specific time and in a 
specific context than it does about the two nations’ supposed ‘characters’ or levels of political ‘maturity’.  
The Czechs and Slovaks are no more (and no less) innately tolerant or nonviolent than any other European 
nation: alongside the peaceful 1989 Velvet Revolution and equally peaceful Velvet Divorce we should 
also remember the forced expulsions of 3 million German speakers, and the forced exchanges or 
‘reSlovakization’ of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian speakers, that took place at the end of the 
Second World War, together with many accompanying atrocities.2 We should also be aware that a number 
                                                 
22 On the German expulsions, see especially T. Stanĕk, Perzekuce 1945 (Prague: Institut pro středoevropskou kulturu 
a politiku, 1996); T. Stanĕk, Tábory v českých zemích 1945-1948 (Ostrava: Tilia, 1996); Dušan Kováč, Vysídlenie 
Nemcov zo Slovenska (1944-1953) (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dĕjiny AV ČR, 2001); M. Schvarc, ‘Evakuácia 
nemeckého obyvateľstva z územia Slovenskej republiky v rokoch 1944-1945’, Historický zborník 15, 1 (2005); Soňa 
Gabzdilová-Olejníková and Milan Olejník, Karpatskí Nemci na Slovensku od druhej svetovej vojny do roku 1953 
(Bratislava: SNM-Múzeum kultúry karpatských Nemcov, 2004; B. Frommer, National Cleansing: Retribution 
against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovkia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); R.M. 
Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2012). On the Hungarian exchanges and forcible ‘re-Slovakization’, see Masarykův ústav AV ČR, 
Benešův archive, EB III, ‘Slovensko 1945’, 60, P60/1, ‘Návrhy’ (13 September 1947) and covering letter from the 
head of the Re-Slovakization Commission in Bratislava to V. Clementis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, ff. 1-
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of racist state policies – especially the state-sponsored persecutions of Gypsies (Roma) in the Czech Lands 
and Jews in the wartime Slovak Republic – were independently legislated and implemented by Czech and 
Slovak authorities, quite apart from those better-known forms of discrimination and persecution that were 
demanded by rival, German authorities.3 
In Eastern and Central Europe, the justification for cruelty to whole groups of people, together 
with widespread faith in the validity of collective guilt, were often based in a sense of national 
vulnerability, the notion that the ‘life’ of one’s own nation would be endangered by the very existence of 
another, rival people. National minorities were commonly portrayed as potential or actual fifth columnists. 
One of the first acts of the independent Slovak state that came into being on 14 March 1939 and collapsed 
in April 1945 was to instruct the Slovak Ministry of Interior to set up a concentration camp, at Ilava near 
Trenčín, to hold prisoner those whom it had ‘reason to fear’ would ‘create an obstacle’ to the ‘building of 
the Slovak state’ (these turned out to be mainly Communists, Hungarians and Jews).4  One of the principal 
ways in which the newly independent Slovak government sought to demonstrate its competence to 
manage its own affairs was by taking its own, distinctively Slovak approach to ‘solving’ the Jewish 
‘problem’ and coming up with anti-semitic legislation which was different from, though no less vicious, 
than the contemporary Nazi German model.5 
The removal of German speakers from the reunited postwar Czechoslovak state was particularly 
brutal. Quite apart from the so-called ‘unofficial’ transfer (divoký odsun) which was marked by the same 
                                                                                                                                                              
8. See also Katalin Vadkerty, Maďarská otázka v Československu 1945-1948: Trilógia o dejinách maďarskej 
menšiny, tr. M. Lesná, K. Borbášová and G. Sándorová (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2002); Iris Engemann, ‘Slovakizácia 
Bratislavy v rokoch 1918-1948’ in M. Medvecký, ed., Fenomén Bratislavy (Bratislava: ústav pamäti národa, 2011) 
and Katalin Vadkerty, ‘Nemci a Maďari v Bratislave v rokoch 1945-1948’ in Kapitoly z dejín Bratislavy (Bratislava: 
Kalligram, 2006).  
3 For English-language accounts, see Jan Láníček, Czechs, Slovaks and the Jews, 1938-1948: Beyond Idealisation or 
Condemnation (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); C. Nečas, The Holocaust of Czech Roma, tr. Šimon Pellar 
(Prague: Prostor,1999); James Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013) and chapters 4 and 5 ‘The Fascist Appeal’ and ‘A Republic and 
a Protectorate’, in Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2009, 2011), pp. 87-149. See also J. Gjuričová, Na okraji: Romové jako object státní politiky (Prague: 
Ministerstvo vnitra, 1999) and B. Kenety, ‘The “Devouring”: A Look at the Romani Holocaust’, 
http://www.romove.cz (27 January 2005). 
4 Decree 32 ‘Vládne nariadenie zo dňa 24. marca 1939 o zaisťovacom uväznení nepriateľov Slovenského štátu’ 
(Government Decree of 24 March 1939 Concerning the Detention of Enemies of the Slovak State).  
5 Law 63, ‘Vládne nariadenie zo dňa 18. apríla 1939 o vymedzení pojmu žida a usmernení počtu židov v niektorých 
slobodných povolaniach’ (20 April 1939), Slovenský zákonník (Bratislava, 1939), 77-79. See also laws 63, 74, 145, 
147, 184, 150, 197 in Slovenský zákonník (Bratislava, 1939), pp. 77-9; 17 (26 April 1939), pp. 88-9; 32-44 (June-
August 1939), pp. 288-301. 
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sorts of atrocities that took place in liberated Poland, Vichy France, and elsewhere (and which included 
the immediate internment and often sadistic maltreatment of German speakers in formerly SS-run 
prisons),6 ‘official’ measures taken against the Germans and Hungarians by the postwar Czechoslovak 
state and/or regional and local authorities included the automatic removal of citizenship and confiscation 
of property (including watches and jewellery, including wedding-rings, during body searches at the 
border); the reduction of food rations to starvation levels; the requirement, in some districts, that German 
speakers wear a white armband to distinguish them from others; incarceration in mass detention and 
forced-labour camps; and the use of overcrowded railway cars to transport German-speaking civilians – 
mainly women and children --  to Germany.7  Many did not survive the journey, let alone the camps. 
Although Germans who could prove that they had been ‘reliable comrades and ant-Fascists’ were 
supposed to be spared, even ethnic Germans who could meet the stringent criteria were usually deported, 
the only difference in their treatment being that the 88,614 ‘anti-Fascist Germans’ that the Ministry of 
Interior recorded as having been expelled by 29 October 1946 were allowed to keep their property and 
were transported separately, in carriages carrying just 300 rather than the more usual 1,200 to 1,500 
expellees at a time.8 
Czech-Slovak rivalries and hatreds, although seemingly never as intense as those between the two 
nations’ traditional national enemies, could nevertheless get quite nasty, as with the expulsions of 9,000 
Czech-speaking public employees from autonomous Slovakia in 1938 or the so-called ‘Slovak bourgeois 
nationalist’ political show trial of 1954 in which the Czechoslovak authorities, not the Soviets, extracted 
                                                 
6 See, for example, the testimony of deputy commandant Václav/Wenzel Hrneček about the routine sadism and 
brutality in Linzervorstadt detention camp (16, 18, 25 July 1952), RG 466/250/84/32/04 box 50, NARA, as cited and 
discussed in R.M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), pp. 130-5. 
7 See Masarykův ústav AV ČR, Benešův archive, EB III, ‘Transféry obyvatelstva (odsun Němců, repatriace čs. 
občanů’, 44, P44/2, Ministerstvo vnitra, ‘Směrnice k provádění soustavného odsunu (transferu) Němců z území 
Československé republiky’, ff. 1-2. See, for example, governmental decree 6 ‘Vládní nařízení o některých opatřeních 
v zásobování obyvatelstva potravinami’ (17 May 1945), p. 11; presidential decree 5 ‘Dekret presidenta republiky o 
neplatnosti některých majetkovĕ-právních jednání z doby nesvobody a o národ. správě majetkových hodnot Němců, 
Maďarů, zrádců a kolaborantů a některých organisací a ústavů’ (19 May 1945), pp. 7-10; presidential decrees 16 and 
18 ‘Dekret presidenta republiky o potrestání nacistických zločinů, zrádců a jejich pomahačů a o mimořadných 
lidových soudech’ (19 June 1945); presidential decree 21 ‘Dekret presidenta republiky o konfiscaci a urychleném 
rozdělení zemědělského majetku Němců, Maďarů, jakož i zrádců a nepřátel českého a slovenského národa (21 June 
1945). See also Tomáš Staněk, Odsun Němců z Československa, 1945-1947 (Prague: Academia, 1991). 
8 Masarykův ústav AV ČR, Benešův archive, EB III, ‘Transféry obyvatelstva (odsun Němců, repatriace čs. občanů’, 
44, P44/3, Nosek and Kučera to Beneš (15 November 1946), ff. 1-4; R.M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The 
Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), p. 191. 
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confessions by means of sleep deprivation and other forms of torture and imposed lengthy prison 
sentences after convicting their Slovak victims on trumped-up charges.9 
So the first lesson that the Czechoslovak example teaches is not to fall into essentialist arguments 
about the so-called ‘national character’ or ‘stage of development’ of any particular nationality. It is not 
just that such stereotypes are patronizing: they are also profoundly misleading. This is an especially 
important lesson for those whose instinct is to divide Central and Eastern Europe into nations of heroes or 
villains, victims or perpetrators, and so remain blind to the more common pattern, in which the same 
national groups may be the victims in one case, but the perpetrators in the next. 
 The second common Western assumption that should be dispelled is the notion that Czech-Slovak 
nationalism or rivalry was somehow ‘frozen’ or successfully ‘suppressed’ under Communism – that 
authoritarian Communist regimes put a lid on nationalism which inevitably blew off after the Communist 
regime fell in 1989-1990. At its crudest, this line of argument states or implies that time stopped with the 
Communist takeover in 1948 only to begin ticking again with the overthrow of the Communist regime in 
1989, as if nothing of any importance or note happened during the four intervening decades, apart from 
brief interludes tellingly referred to as ‘thaws’ or, in the Czechoslovak case, the Prague ‘Spring’.  In fact, 
of course, Czech-Slovak national tensions and rivalries never went away: and relations between the Czech 
and Slovak nations continued to be negotiated under successive Communist leaderships, which were 
themselves subject to change over time: Communist rule was not the same thing under Gottwald or 
Zápotocký as under Novotný, Dubček or Husák or, again, under Jakeš, any more than Soviet rule was the 
same thing under Stalin, Khrushchev or Gorbachev.  Among the most grotesque, but seldom remembered, 
political show trials to take place in the Eastern bloc were the so-called Slovak ‘bourgeois nationalist’ 
trials that concluded on 24 April 1954 and which, unlike the notorious Slánský and related show trials, had 
                                                 
9 A formal agreement for the removal of about 9,000 Czech state employees was reached on 12 December 1938 
between the autonomous Slovak authorities in Bratislava and the central Czecho-Slovak government in Prague. The 
Slovak ‘bourgeois nationalist’ political show trial (‘Proces s rozvratnou skupinou buržoáznych nacionalistov na 
Slovensku’) took place 21-24 April 1954, at a time when the Soviet Union was officially seeking to turn away from 
Stalin’s ‘crimes’, including political show trials. The Czechoslovak Communist Party, which had the largest statue of 
Stalin anywhere in the world erected in Prague in 1955, did not announce its own ‘de-Stalinization’ campaign until 
the end of 1961. The Slovak ‘bourgeois nationalists’ were formally cleared by the Barnabitky commission of 1963. 
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nothing to do with either the Soviet Union or with Stalin.  One of the Prague Spring reforms associated 
with Alexander Dubček’s presidium (politburo), and the only one not to be reversed after the Warsaw Pact 
intervention of August 1968, was the federalization of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic into a union of 
two republics: The Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic.  First Secretary Alexander 
Dubček and his successor, Gustáv Husák, both Slovaks, had risen to power in the statewide Czechoslovak 
Communist Party by way of leadership of the regional Slovak Communist Party.10 
Struggles within the Czechoslovak state over Czechoslovak centralisation versus Slovak 
autonomy, struggles which first came to a head in 1938-9, peaking in Slovak autonomy in October 1938 
and in Slovak independence in March 1939, continued to be negotiated after the return to a unitary state in 
1945 and the piecemeal erosion of Slovak autonomy between 1945 and 1948.  Further constitutional 
adjustments were made in 1960, when Czechoslovakia became a Socialist Republic and Slovakia was 
divided into regions; and again in 1969, when Czechoslovakia became a Federation of two nominally 
equal Socialist republics, one Czech and one Slovak, under a Czechoslovak Communist structure.11  In 
short, various attempts to regulate Czech-Slovak relations were tried during the Communist period as well 
as both before and after it.  So the national question was in fact neither ‘frozen’ in time nor successfully 
‘suppressed’ during the Communist period. 
 A third assumption, one which was especially prominent in Slovak émigré literature before the 
regime change in 1989 and has continued to be reflected in official Slovak documents since 1993, is the 
assumption that independence was the natural or final expression of the will of the Slovak people: that the 
Slovak nation, supposed somehow to have existed (in spirit if not on maps) survived underground in all 
ages and was inevitably to find expression in a Slovak state.  While serious Slovak scholarship has moved 
on, this remains the assumption made in most works on Slovak history published in English, of which the 
best-known is exemplar is probably Josef Kirschbaum’s Slovakia: The Struggle For Survival (New York: 
St Martin’s, 1995). In such portrayals, the territory that forms today’s Slovak republic but used to be 
                                                 
10 See M. Heimann, ‘The Scheming Apparatchik of the Prague Spring’, Europe-Asia Studies 60:10 (December 
2008), 1717-34. 
11For the text of the 1960 Constitution see Constitutional Law (Ústavní zákon) 100, Ústava Československé 
socialistické republiky (11 July 1960), Sbírka zákonů Československé socialistické republiky. Prague: Knihtisk, 1960 
or http://www.psp.cz/docs/texts/constitution_1960.html 
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known as Upper Hungary or Felvidék, is treated as if its history formed part of a ‘Slovak’, rather than an 
‘Hungarian’, story from as long ago as the tenth century.  This sort of Whiggish narrative, in which the 
‘nation’ (whether Slovak, Czech, Polish, Hungarian, German, Ruthenian, Ukrainian or any other), is 
anachronistically presented as if it had always existed in the late-nineteenth and twentieth-century senses, 
even during historical periods when language or ethnicity were far less important markers of identity than, 
say, region or religious denomination or place in the social hierarchy -- will be familiar to anyone with 
even the most rudimentary experience of Central and Eastern Europe. Until very recently, and still in a 
great deal of contemporary Czech historiography, the historical lands of the Bohemian Crown have 
similarly been presented as if they had always been linguistically and ethnically Czech, rather than – as 
they in fact were – mixed German, Czech, Polish, Ruthenian/Ukrainian, Jewish and Gypsy. Rival histories 
of Central and Eastern European nations which continue to be presented to modern view remain highly 
contested and are often profoundly misleading. 
 Given these three central objections, one might well ask: if the Czechs and Slovak are not 
necessarily any more peaceful than any other nationality; if Czech-Slovak rivalries were not effectively 
suppressed under Communism; and if there was nothing inevitable or predetermined about the creation of 
either a Czech or Slovak state, how is one to account for the fact that Czechoslovakia did in fact split into 
two countries, just two years after the Czechoslovak Communist Party was ousted from power, and that 
the split proceeded without violence? 
 There seem to me to be five main reasons to account for why the break-up of the Czechoslovak 
state occurred at the time, and in the peaceful way, that it did. These may be briefly summarised as 
follows: 
1. The two ‘nations’, i.e. Czech-speakers and Slovak-speakers, were already largely separate 
anyway. Czechs and Slovaks did not mix all that much, even before the Velvet Divorce. Czechs 
mostly lived in the Bohemian Crown Lands, while Slovakia – with the exception of its important, 
and contested, Hungarian and Ruthenian (Rusyn or Ukrainian) minorities – remained 
overwhelmingly inhabited by Slovaks. 
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2. The borders of the prospective territories were not in dispute. The Bohemian Crown Lands had 
existed as a clear and distinct administrative unit for centuries, and an independent Bohemian 
Kingdom had existed in the past (until the infamous Bohemian defeat at the White Mountain --
Bílá hora -- in 1620).  Although Slovakia had not existed, even as a serious geographical concept, 
before the First World War, because post-Munich Slovakia was briefly autonomous between 1938 
and 1939 and independent for the six years between 1939 and 1945, there was also a Slovak 
precedent for an independent Slovak republic. 
3. Whether or not to end the Czechoslovak state was not left to the people to decide. Had a 
referendum been held in either 1991 or 1992, the breakup of the federal state would not have 
happened. Opinion polls taken in both halves of the state showed the overwhelming majority of 
both Czechs and Slovaks to be in favour of remaining together in a single Czechoslovak state.  
What led the Czech and Slovak premiers to negotiate the break-up of the state anyway, without 
popular mandate, was the deadlock caused by the fact that, although the Czech and Slovak 
leaderships both claimed to wish to retain Czechoslovakia, they seemed unable to agree on 
anything else. And since the race to join NATO, and the European Union -- to ‘return’ to Europe 
– was on, there was a sense of urgency, especially on the Czech side, to move forward, with or 
without Slovakia. 
4. The structures for separate republics were already in place. Practically the only ‘Prague Spring’ 
reform not to have been overturned after the Warsaw Pact intervention of August 1968 was the 
federalization of the state into two socialist republics: the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak 
Socialist Republic. Having nominally separate administrative structures, capital cities and political 
parties was arguably rather meaningless so long as the Czechoslovak Communist Party remained 
the real power in the land; but federalization meant that the infrastructure for separate republics 
already existed, at least on paper.  This surely made separation easier both to contemplate and, 
after 1989, to implement. 
5. The times were exceptional. The division of Czechoslovakia took place at a time when the 
impossible, the overthrow of Communist Party rule, had just been achieved.  The atmosphere was 
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one that made radical change seem much more possible. Heightened fear of being left out in the 
cold, perhaps without EU or NATO protection, made Czechoslovaks eager to act, and to act 
quickly, to try to safeguard their future at a time of new risks and possibilities. 
* 
Between the summer of 1990 and the elections in June 1992, summit after summit between the Czech and 
Slovak governments was called to try to reach a consensus on a formulation of a new kind of 
federalization that would be deemed acceptable by both sides and so could be passed by the Federal 
Assembly. At the first meeting of the leaders of the Czech, Slovak and federal governments (held at 
Trenčianské Teplice on 8-9 August 1990), a proposal was drawn up suggesting that decision-making 
power be devolved to the republics, but that defence, foreign policy, border security and police powers, 
together with taxation and price controls, be retained by the federal government.  After the proposal was 
rejected by the representatives of the Slovak National Party, together with eight smaller parties, Czech 
Prime Minister Petr Pithart announced that the Trenčianské Teplice agreement was the only viable 
alternative to the disintegration of the state.12 
At a celebration to commemorate Andrej Hlinka, the founder of the Slovak People’s Party, held a 
couple of weeks later and attended by about fifteen thousand people, speakers called on the Slovak 
National Council to declare Slovak sovereignty and shouted ‘Down with Czechoslovak federation!’ and 
‘Long Live the Slovak State!’ Demonstrations followed in Bratislava to demand that Slovak be made the 
official language in Slovakia.  On 25 October 1990, the Slovak parliament adopted a new law to do just 
that, with the right for minorities (only in areas where they formed at least 20 per cent of the population) 
to use their own language in an official capacity.  In a television address on 28 October 1990 to mark the 
seventy-second anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak state, Czechoslovak President Václav 
Havel pleaded with the Czechs to put aside their ‘condescending attitude’ towards the Slovaks and 
appealed to the Slovaks to avoid ‘nationalist demagoguery’. 
                                                 
12 See P. Pithart, Devěta osmdesátý: Vzpomínky a přemýšlení. Krédo (Prague, Academia, 2009) and J. Rychlík, Češi 
a Slováci ve 20. století: Spolupráce a konflikty 1914-1992 (Vyšehrad: Ústav pro stadium totalitních režimů, 2012). 
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The Trenčianské Teplice proposal was twice returned to the negotiating table, barely amended, 
before being approved by republican bodies on both sides in November, and finally by the Federal 
Assembly on 12 December 1990. Agreement on devolution seemed finally to have been reached. The next 
round of difficulties arose over the need to draft three separate constitutions (federal, Czech and Slovak).  
As Allison Stanger explains, article 1 of the 1968 Law on Federation opens with the claim that 
Czechoslovakia’s two constituent nations, each of which possesses sovereignty (suverenita), have joined 
together of their own will; but fails to explain how this kind of suverenita relates to svrchovanost (e.g. 
‘sovereignty’ in international affairs).13 This left the way open for the Slovak premier Vladimír Mečiar to 
argue that Slovakia had the right to negotiate its own treaties and enter independently into international 
negotiations with foreign powers, and for former dissident Ján Čarnogurský to maintain that the two 
republics must conclude a treaty (smlouva) to codify Czech-Slovak equality before embarking on the 
question of federal competencies.  The Czech side, unwilling to countenance any radical break with the 
legal past on the grounds that this would be potentially dangerous for future constitutional developments, 
insisted that there was no need to clarify the meaning of ‘sovereignty’ and that only internationally 
recognised bodies could enter into treaty agreements. The Slovak side, mistrustful of Czech promises, 
refused to budge until its national ‘sovereignty’ was assured. The result was a complete impasse. 
By March 1991, things were starting to get ugly. Thousands of Slovaks, whose anti-regime revolution 
– aimed at the federal government in Prague as well as at Communist Party rule – was still in full swing, 
kept up the momentum by repeatedly turning up in SNP Square in Bratislava to reject Prague and call for 
independence. Meanwhile, calls for a referendum on the continuation of the state were being heard from 
every quarter, Czech as well as Slovak. On 13 March, between five and ten thousand people turned up to a 
ceremony in Bratislava to consecrate a cross on the grave of the former Slovak fascist dictator (and war 
criminal) Jozef Tiso in honour of the fifty-second anniversary of the founding of the first, extreme 
nationalist, Slovak state. When President Václav Havel unexpectedly appeared at the rally, he was shouted 
at and even attacked. Later that day, the president made a television address to the Slovak people in which 
                                                 
13 A. Stanger, ‘Price of Velvet’ in Kraus and Stanger, eds., Irreconcilable Differences?Explaining Czechoslovakia’s 
Dissolution (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 144. 
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he pleaded with them not to seek independence by unconstitutional means, but also declared that he would 
respect the outcome of a Slovak referendum on the question. After a parliamentary crisis in April, Mečiar 
was replaced as Slovak prime minister by Čarnogurský and the Slovak revolutionary organisation Public 
Against Violence (Verejnosť proti násiliu or VPN) formally split into two: a new faction, led by Mečiar 
and calling itself Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko or HZDS); and 
the remainder, which now represented a substantially weakened rump VPN. 
By September 1991, everyone was speculating openly about the division of the state and calling for a 
referendum on the question; petitions were being circulated and signed on both sides; a movement for 
Moravian autonomy also seemed to be gaining ground.  On 3 November 1991, in a last-ditch attempt to 
avoid a split, President Havel held a meeting with the Czech and Slovak leaders at his summer house at 
Hrádeček at which a number of constitutional amendments were proposed. All were blocked by the 
Slovak nationalist side, which saw no good reason to give up its only trump card: the capacity to block 
any unwanted piece of Czech-sponsored Czechoslovak legislation. In the end, after two failed attempts to 
agree on even the terms of a dissolution of the state, on 25 November 1992 the Federal Assembly agreed 
that the constitution should be amended to separate the Czech and Slovak republics into completely 
independent states. 
On 31 December 1992, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. The next day, 1 January 1993, two new states 
– the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia – took their place on the third ‘new’ map of Europe to 
have appeared in a century.14 The Czech Republic, which declared in the preamble to its constitution to be 
‘reconstituting’ an ‘independent Czech state’, drew its line of descent from the medieval Kingdom of 
Bohemia down to the twentieth-century Czechoslovak Republic without so much as mentioning the 
Habsburg Empire, let alone the Holy Roman Empire.15 It naturally retained Prague as its capital city and 
the Castle (Hrad) as the official seat of state power; but also kept the old Czechoslovak flag and other 
national and state symbols, although explicitly forbidden to do so by law. It also kept 28 October, 
                                                 
14 See Laws 460, ‘Ústava Slovenskej republiky’ (1 October 1992), Sbírka zákonů České a Slovenské Federativní 
  Republiky (Prague 1992), p. 241 and 13 (6 March 1990), pp. 2659–80; 542, ‘Ústavní zákon o zániku České a 
Slovenské Federativní Republiky’, Sbírka zákonů České a Slovenské Federativní Republiky, r. 1992, č. 110 (8 
December 1992), pp. 3253–4, 1, ‘Ústava České republiky’, Sbírka zákonů České republiky, r. 1993, č. 1 (28 
December 1992), pp. 1–16. 
15 Ústava České republiky’, Sbírka zákonů České republiky, r. 1993, č. 1 (28 December 1992), p. 1. 
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Czechoslovak Independence Day, as a state holiday whereas Slovakia, tellingly, did not. Slovakia revived 
the double-barred cross that had been used during the first Slovak republic; advertised itself as a 
‘Christian’ country, and kept its Hungarian, Ruthenian, Gypsy and Jewish populations at arm’s length, 
even in the preamble to its new constitution, by defining the Slovak people as heirs to the Great Moravian 
Empire of the ninth century who – together with ‘members of national minorities and ethnic groups living 
in the Slovak Republic’ – wished to ‘implement democratic forms of government’ and promote ‘spiritual, 
cultural and economic prosperity’.16 
* 
Czechoslovakia’s peaceful separation into independent Czech and Slovak states was widely hailed in the 
West as an example of Czech political maturity, a Velvet Divorce to match its Velvet Revolution, in 
contrast with the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and the chaos unfolding in the former republics of 
the USSR. Spokesmen for the Czechs made the most of the contrast, suggesting that the legality and 
peacefulness of the separation proved the Czechs to be mature, confident and responsible enough as a 
nation to let the younger, more impetuous Slovaks go. Slovaks, on the other hand, argued that the Czechs 
had deliberately left them in the lurch to speed up their own transition to capitalism and to curry favour 
with the West, leaving Slovakia with no option but to plump for independence by refusing all viable 
alternative forms of sovereignty. Although neither the Czech nor the Slovak populations wanted to take 
responsibility for ending the state, let alone stand accused of petty nationalism or ethnic chauvinism, 
prominent spokesmen for both nations seemed relieved to have the matter settled. The split was described, 
on both sides, as undesirable but ‘inevitable’, as if it had been predestined, a natural development in the 
course of the ‘life’ of the Czech and Slovak nations. 
The flattering notion of a ‘Velvet Divorce’, as Abbey Innes has pointed out, underestimates the depth 
of the authoritarian Communist legacy, which made it possible for such a radical act to be passed, without 
                                                 
16 No. 50, ‘Ústavný zákon Slovenskej národnej rady z 1. marca 1990 o názve, štátnom znaku, štátnej pečati a o 
štátnej hymne Slovenskej republiky’ (1 March 1990) and no. 53, ‘Ústavní zákon České národní rady ze dne 6. března 
1990 o změně názvu České socialistické republiky’ (6 March 1990), Sbírka zákonů Československé socialistické 
republiky (Prague, 1990), pp. 241, 250. The English translation cited here is from the approved National Council of 
the Slovak Republic, The Constitution of the Slovak Republic (Press Agency of the Slovak Republic, Pressfoto, 
1993), p. 15. 
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a referendum, and against the stated wishes of a majority in both republics.17 Among the people of what 
was still Czechoslovakia, the decision to end the state was widely blamed on the ‘arrogance’ and high-
handedness of the two politicians – the Slovak Vladimír Mečiar and the Czech Václav Klaus – who 
brokered the deal, securing their own political positions in the process. It afterwards became a matter of 
almost obsessive interest to scholars to seek to solve the paradox of how, as Carol Leff put it, it could have 
come about that a democratic state could have ‘disintegrated even though a majority of its citizens 
favoured its continuance.’18 
* 
The Czechoslovak case offers a number of variations on themes familiar to those with knowledge of 
Eastern and Central Europe in general and the South Caucasus in particular.  It therefore seems worth 
seeking to establish what general lessons might be learned from the case of Czechoslovakia. 
What I’d like to stress above all are the dangers of allowing history to be used (or, rather, 
misused) to bolster the position, or reputation, of any particular ‘nation’ as against another. Most, if not 
all, nations have their moments of heroism and martyrdom, episodes in which they appear as victims and 
others in which they appear as perpetrators. We should not fall into the trap of stereotyping whole peoples 
as if they were innately ‘violent’ or innately ‘peaceful’, innately ‘Communist’ or innately ‘Fascist’, 
innately ‘progressive’ or innately ‘backward’, as if these attitudes were somehow hard-wired into their 
DNA. 
Construing one’s nation as the blameless victim is endemic to the whole of the East-Central 
European region: this is the way that rival groups have traditionally sought to justify their right to exist as 
nations or as states. Countless state-funded historical institutes, school textbooks, historical monographs, 
documentaries, museums, memorials and tourist guides exist to support such narratives. These same 
nationalist narratives, consisting largely of simplified, selective and partial presentations of the past, are 
                                                 
17 A. Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven, 2001), pp. xii, 73. 
18 C.S. Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republic: Nation versus State (Boulder, Co., 1997), p. 128. 
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generally incompatible with those being simultaneously put forward by neighbours, rivals and 
opponents.19   
The teaching, writing and presentation of history has an important role to play in the quest for 
regional stability. Historical research can help not so much by providing ready-made models to be applied 
to current conflicts, but rather by uncovering a plurality of perspectives and encouraging a diversity of 
interpretations. School textbooks, museum exhibitions, monuments and state-sponsored documentaries, as 
well as historical monographs and scholarly articles, should ideally include embarrassing and shameful as 
well as heroic and self-justifying aspects of the nation’s past, be scrupulous to avoid historical 
anachronisms and Whiggish assumptions, and take care to present regional and local, as well as national, 
perspectives. Only by recognising common experiences both of victimhood and perpetrator guilt may 
local populations come to empathise with and humanise their traditional enemies, and so come to see that 
what divides them is generally much smaller than what unites them. 
 
     Mary Heimann 
     Kyiv, Ukraine, 27 March 2015 
                                                 
19 For a helpful regional survey, see James Mark, The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past 
in Central-Eastern Europe (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010).  
